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الضفة الغربية وقطاع (تعالج الدراسة قضية االحتالل لألراضي الفلسطينية 
وبتقاسـم . جوالن ومزارع شبعا ولن تتناول الدراسة االحتالل اإلسرائيلي لل ) غزة
إدارة األراضي المحتلة جهتان السلطة الفلسطينية وإدارة االحتالل غير أن الجهة 
األول غير قادرة بنفسها، ألنها التملك سيادة كاملة على األراضـي المحتلـة؛ إذ 
لهذا سوف تهتم الدراسة بتحديد فكرة االحتالل ودراسة القرارات . سيادتها ناقصة 
 والوضع القانوني للقدس 1948بفلسطين منذ االعتراف بدولة إسرائيل الخاصة 
 .الشرقية ولقطاع غزة
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Some Remarks on the United Nations  
and Territorial Sovereignty  
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
 
Dr. Giovanni Distefano•                                
 
The present contribution is limited to the investigation of the possibility 
of the creation of territorial titles by effectiveness in the Palestine question. 
Ratione loci it will deal exclusively with the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
i.e. the West Bank (including East-Jerusalem) and Gaza, leaving the Golan 
Heights and the Sheba Farms aside. When one speaks about territorial titles 
engendered by the effectiveness of occupation, one is induced to mention this 
possibility solely for Israel(1). The other actor, that is the Palestine Authority 
(hereinafter: PA), has never been able to avail itself of actual occupation “en 
tant que souverain” of the aforementioned territories. There is indeed no 
doubt that such effectiveness is clearly lacking(2). 
A. The conceptual construction of territorial title 
We can conceive a binary outline of the concept of the territorial title. 
The latter, as the ground of any subjective right, may be split into a titulus 
adquisitionis on the one hand and modus adquisitionis on the other. We 
borrowed these terms, notwithstanding their orthography, from the 
vocabulary of the modern civil law of Romanist inspiration. The first one, the 
titulus adquisitionis, represents the legality (the justification, the cause) of 
                                      
•  Charge de course University de Geneva Faculty de droit Department de droit International public et 
organization international 
(1)  For the historical account of these events: PAPPE, I., History of modern Palestine : one land, two 
peoples, Cambridge, 2004; MORRIS, B., Righteous Victims. A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 
1881-2001, New York, 2001. 
(2)  It is true that the PA was endowed, in accordance with 1993 Oslo agreements, with some prerogatives 
pertaining to State functions in certain sectors of Palestine called « Zone A », but as the International 
Court of Justice affirmed in 2004 : “Such transfers have taken place, but, as a result of subsequent 
events, they remained partial and limited » (Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, advisory opinion of 9th July 2004: I.C.J. Reports 2004, § 77). 
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the territorial transfer whereas the second one, the modus adquisitionis, refers 
to the requirement of effectiveness of this change of sovereignty. There will 
be perfect legal transfer when these two elements are united under the same 
State(3). These two constitutive components of the legal title summarize in 
effect the underlying tension of any territorial conflict namely that between 
legality and effectiveness. The come together of these two elements within 
the same titular marks the end of this tension and thus the perfection of the 
legal title. In other words, by the word title the accent is put inexorably on 
the legality of the territorial transfer, in short on the foundation of the right of 
territorial sovereignty whereas modus adquisitionis refers to its effectiveness. 
In consequence, one ought to distinguish as clearly as possible the actual 
possession of the thing (or the adprehensio physica) from the title to this 
possession (titulus adquisitionis)(4). This necessity to combine the right to 
possess a thing (or to occupy a ground) with its actual possession, i.e. the 
physical acts which render it possible, represents the foundation of any legal 
order(5). 
The principle of effectiveness with regard of territorial titles 
Difficult task that of the definition of effectiveness: arduous but 
necessary. One of the most eminent legal writers, Charles  De VISSCHER, 
wrote in these terms : « Elle [l’effectivité] se dérobe à toute définition 
générale. Elle suggère à la fois l’idée d’une certaine tension et celle d’une 
ultime adéquation entre le fait et le droit »(6). At the heart of the relations 
between law and fact, the effectiveness makes us think instinctively of the 
                                      
(3)            On this point, see the Author in L’ordre international entre légalité et effectivité. Le titre 
juridique dans le contentieux territorial, Paris, 2002, pp. 66-80 et 106-131. 
(4)           KANT, I., The Metaphysics of Ethics, First Part, Second Section, Chapter 1, § 15. 
(5)         « ...[L’]occupation n’est pas par elle-même un titre suffisant et légitime pour acquérir la propriété, 
car, pour occuper, il faut, avant tout, avoir le droit de le faire. », FIORE, P. Nouveau droit 
international public suivant les besoins de la civilisation moderne, Première partie, Paris, 
(translated from Italian by PRADIER-FODERE, P.), 1868, pp. 378-379.  
(6)         DE VISSCHER, Ch., « Observations sur l’effectivité en droit international public », RGDIP, Vol. 
62   (1958), p. 601: « It [the effectiveness] slips away from a general definition. It suggests at once 
the idea of a certain strain and that of an ultimate concordance between Facts and Law” [Our 
translation]. 
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social tides that invest the shore of  law. Erosion of course, but also 
consolidation of the legal coastline(7). In order to grasp the principle of 
effectiveness one is accustomed to describe it by a maxim drawn from 
Roman law : « Ex facto oritur ius »(8)often cited in contradiction with another 
maxima:« Ex iniuria ius non oritur ».(9) From the beginning we ought to 
dispel a terminological quiproquo, because many terms are used to this end: 
principle, rule, criterion, condition of effectiveness. What is it really about? 
How to designate the effectiveness? But, if the word rule is too close to the 
idea of precept or norm, the word principle, on the contrary, presupposes an 
universality and a necessity which make it more legally stringent. For these 
reasons, we will opt for this term. The principle of effectiveness represents 
the link between law and fact in the process of the creation of rules and legal 
situations; it is the guardian of the immanence of law in the social cluster. 
The international order, characterized by the dispersal of power, the juridical 
equality of its members and their factual disparity offers a large place to the 
principle of effectiveness(10). The horizontal and territorial structure of the 
international Community as it exists at least since the end of the XVI century 
embodies the fact that States aim at exercising territorial competences that 
are incompatible among them. The principle of effectiveness in its diverse 
applications and manifestations pervades the international order and 
constitutes its vital lymph.  
The territorial title, as ground for subjective absolute rights such as 
sovereignty, has to be characterized by a relative minimum of effectiveness 
in order to produce legal effects. For the effectiveness to represent the 
material fact generating the title of territorial sovereignty, two conditions 
must be fulfilled: on one hand the actual occupation showing the State’s 
                                      
(7)  Seen from this point of view – and more fundamentally – the criterion of effectiveness measures the 
asymptotic equivalence between norm and fact. 
(8)   D.52 ad leg. Aquilia. 
(9)   The origin of this saying lays in the shades of History. 
(10) It has been rightly observed that because of  « ...l’intersubjectivisme qui règne dans un tel monde où 
l’Etat décide de ce qu’il est et de ce que sont les autres, l’effectivité y apporte un élément 
d’objectivisation indispensable », TOUSCOZ, J., Le principe d’effectivité dans l’ordre international, 
Paris, 1964, p. v. 
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animus imperii, and on the other, the nullius nature of the concerned 
territory(11). But apart from this concrete case (uninhabited territory) the large 
majority of territorial conflicts amounts to the dissociation between validity 
and effectiveness of the legal title: there will be a claim founded on the 
validity of the territorial title and another based on the effectiveness of 
occupation. The effectiveness of the international legal order depends on its 
capacity to react with regard to territorial situations devoided of legal title; on 
its capacity to give modulated answers to the situation; on its capacity to 
offer legal remedy where effectiveness and nullity are closely intertwined. In 
so doing, the international legal order, under the pressure of social forces 
diverging with the new territorial situation, will resist in an efficient way, for 
in any conflict between legal titles it will be the one with the highest degree 
of perfection that will prevail. By opposing effectiveness to effectiveness, the 
international community will then prevent the illegal situation to consolidate. 
In the light of the construction of the concept of legal title sketched 
earlier one could maintain that the State which has carried out the conquest 
(annexation) enjoys indeed of a modus adquirendi which lacks nevertheless 
the titulus adquisitionis. In this specific case, the effectiveness cannot by 
itself create a territorial title if it is not accompanied by the titulus 
adquisitionis(12). As long as the international community effectively resists to 
this illegal situation, the former will enjoy the titulus. Therefore, it is not 
merely and solely the attitude of the State (or the subject of law) dispossessed 
which must here be taken into account, but also that of the international 
community. Hence, on must distinguish these situations from those were 
territorial transfers always contra titulum adquisitionis, are operated without 
force (or the threat of it): in other words those which could be qualified as 
                                      
(11) On the attributes of sovereignty and the State jurisdictions which follow therefrom, see especially : The 
Island of Palmas Case (United States / Netherlands), arbitral award of 4th April 1928, RIAA, Vol. 2, pp. 
835-850.  
(12) « … un siècle de possession injuste ne suffit pas pour enlever à celle-ci les vices de son origine », 
HEFFTER, A.W., Le droit international public de l’Europe, translated from German, Berlin-Paris, 
1866, § 12, p. 29 ; « Quod initio vitiosum est, non potest tractu temporis convalescere », D.50.17.29 
[Paulus lib.8 ad Sabinum]. 
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“disputed possessions”(13), where the attitude of the State directly involved is 
essential. In fact with regard to the Palestine question, two peremptory rules 
of general international law are at stake: the one prohibiting the use of force 
and the one embodying the right of people to self-determination. These 
represent the two pillars on which the international community has been built 
and based upon in its contemporary structure. 
B. Application to the Palestine question (1948-2005): Titulus and 
Modus adquisitionis 
C.1 From the proclamation of independence of Israel (14th May 
1948) to its admission to the UN (11th May 1949): the conquering 
effectiveness? 
From the outset, one should make clear that the Palestine question 
cannot be reduced to a mere territorial dispute and even less to an interstate 
conflict because at least three subjects of international law are directly 
involved with regard to the creation of territorial titles. A State (Israel), a sui 
generis legal subject (Palestine Authority) and the UN (international 
universal organisation with general competence) holder of the power of 
disposal of the territorial title. However, this question is characterised by 
several features of a classical territorial dispute. In any territorial controversy, 
it is of bon ton to determine the critical date. According to the traditional 
vulgate, the principle of critical date involves the freezing in the creation, 
extinction and modification of competing territorial titles(14). In our case, the 
critical date is clearly represented by the end of the British mandate on 
Palestine(15). The last title of territorial sovereignty which is uncontested and 
                                      
(13)   Cf. KOHEN, M., Possession contestée et souveraineté territoriale, Paris, 1997 ; DISTEFANO, G., 
L’ordre international  entre légalité et effectivité. Le titre juridique dans le contentieux territorial, 
Paris, Pedone, 2002, pp. 284-292 
(14)   « Whatever are the rights of the Parties then, those are still the rights of the Parties now », British   
Memorial, Antarctica case (United Kingdom v. Argentina): I.C.J. Memorials 1956, § 35. 
(15)    By “Mandatory Palestine” it is meant the territory circumscribed by the League of Nations mandate 
conferred in July 1922 to Great Britain. Originally, this territory included also nowadays Jordan, 
which was finally been separated (according to art. 25 of the Mandate) by the mandatory Power and 
became in 1923 an independent State – Transjordan – under the reign of the Hashemite. From then 
7
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incontestable is that of the Ottoman Empire which was jointly transferred to 
the League of Nations (hereinafter: LN) by the Treaty of Sèvres of 1920 
(arts. 94-97) - albeit it never entered into force – and by the Treaty of 
Lausanne of 1923(16). The legal title and the factual situation at that time - 
and until the end of the mandate (14-15 may 1948) (17) – coincided with the 
effectiveness (in other words there was no division between titulus and 
modus adquisitionis). The end of the British mandate, in conformity with the 
resolution of the General Assembly of the UNO (successor of the legal title 
of the LN) (18) as well as the actual withdrawal of the mandatory Power put an 
end to the effective occupation but not to the titulus which remained vested 
with the UNO. The latter, as successor of the LN in the title of the territorial 
sovereignty on the Mandatory Palestine, decided of a Plan of partition(19), 
enshrined in resolution 181 (II) of the General Assembly (29 November 
1947)(20). This plan which envisaged the creation of two States an Arab and a 
Jewish as well as an international statute for the city of Jerusalem was 
accepted by the Jews but rejected by the Arab States. 
The first Israeli Arab war ended with a series of armistices concluded 
with the benediction of the Security Council (SC). These international 
agreements (with Syria, Egypt and Transjordan) fixed, among other things, 
demarcation lines between Israel and each of these 3 States. The one which is 
of utmost interest drew a line – which has been henceforth been labelled the 
                                                                                                      
onwards, the territory of “Mandatory Palestine” was restricted to the strip of land between the West 
bank of the Jordan and the Mediterranean Sea. 
(16)     On the history of the legal status of the « Mandatory Palestine » cf.: Legal consequences of the      
construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, op.cit., §§ 70-78.  
(17)   According to the Plan of partition of Palestine (GA resolution of 29 November 1947, Section A.1). 
(18)   See :  Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South    
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (1970-1971), advisory opinion 
of 21st June 1971 : I.C.J. Reports 1971, § 103. 
(19) « L’Etat arabe aurait la Galilée occidentale, la Cisjordanie (sans Jérusalem) et, au sud, une bande de 
littoral allant du sud de Jaffa jusqu’à l’Egypte. Il comprendrait une population de 735 000 personnes 
dont 720 000 arabes et 10 000 juifs. L’Etat juif aurait une population de 905 000 personnes dont 498 
000 juifs et 407 000 arabes auxquels il faut ajouter environ  90 000 bédouins. La ville de Jérusalem 
[placée sous statut international] a une population de 100 000 juifs et de 105 000 arabes », 
CHAGNOLLAUD, J.-P., SOUIAH, S.-A., Les frontières au Moyan-Orient, Paris, 2004, p. 94. 
(20) See map at the end of this article. 
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“Green Line” – which divided on the one hand the territories occupied by 
Israel and, on the other hand, Transjordan (regarding the sector of the West 
Bank) and Egypt (Gaza strip). In these circumstances, Israel submitted to the 
UN its request for admission in conformity with article 4 of the UN Charter. 
In its letter with the request for admission (dated 29 November 1948) 
addressed to the Secretary general of the UN, the provisional government of 
Israel declared that the creation of this State has been done “by virtue of the 
natural and historic right of the Jewish people to independence in its 
sovereign State and in pursuance of the General Assembly resolution of 29 
November 1947 [Plan of partition]”(21). 
The discussions in the SC turned around the existence of Israel as a 
State according to public international law, but the apple of discord was 
clearly represented by the absence of border delimitation in all points and its 
repercussions on its quality of State. The British delegate was prophetic 
when he affirmed that the borders of Israel risked not to be fixed “for some 
considerable time to come”(22). Nevertheless it was the position of the USSR 
which was involuntarily lightening on the question of the legality of the 
creation of the State of Israel with regard to resolution 181 (II). The Soviet 
delegate said the following: “The State of Israel has been created and exists 
in accordance with a resolution passed in the General Assembly of 29 
November 1947. It is therefore incorrect to assert that its territory is not 
defined. Its territory is clearly defined by an international decision of the 
United Nations, namely by the resolution adopted on 29 November 1947 by 
the General Assembly”(23). Except that,  if we could intervene in the debate, 
that the territory allotted to the State of Israel did not coincide – and by far 
not – with the extension of the military occupation at the moment of the 
request (and the admission) of Israel. So one ought to raise a blatant 
                                      
(21) Doc. S/1093 (in Security Council Official Records, Third Year, Supplement for December 1948,  p. 
118). 
(22) Security Council Proceedings, n°128, 383rd Meeting, p. 16. 
(23) Security Council Proceedings, n°128, 383rd Meeting, p. 22. 
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territorial discrepancy(24): parts of the territory (not insignificant by the way) 
escaped from the scope of the legal title availed of by Israel(25). Resolution 
181 (II) invoked by Israel could not legalize its occupation in all of the 
sectors where there was such a gap from the Plan of partition. The UK in its 
capacity as former mandatory Power underlined this gap and recalled that 
borders “… are at present quite unsettled not only in detail, but in large and 
important areas; they do not yet know whether the Jews will retain central 
and northern Galilee [they will eventually] and the city of Jaffa [they will 
eventually]. On the assumption that they do retain these areas, we do not 
know what territorial adjustments [none eventually] will be made in other 
parts of Palestine to compensate the Arabs for the loss of territories to which 
the Assembly in November 1947 considered them to have a just title”(26). The 
requirement of compensation ensues precisely from the absence of titulus 
adquisitionis of Israel on these territories(27). Consequently one has to assess 
the legal value of the occupation by Israel in terms of territorial titles of the 
territories that the Plan of partition awarded either to the Arab State or to the 
future international city of Jerusalem(28). Therefore, it was useless if not 
squarely absurd for the Soviet delegate to repeat ad nauseam that: “Not only 
does this resolution define precisely the territory of the State of Israel but it 
even includes an appended map, which can be seen at any time by any 
                                      
(24) « La situation sur le terrain consacre de facto un substantiel agrandissement de l’Etat juif en Palestine 
par rapport à ce qui avait été prévu dans la résolution du 29 novembre 1947. Son territoire passe en 
effet de 14 000 à 21 000 kilomètres carrés [a 50 % increase !], incluant désormais toute la Galilée, la 
partie ouest de Jérusalem jusqu’aux abords des murailles de la vieille ville qui passe sous contrôle 
jordanien, le Néguev jusqu’au port d’Eilat sur la mer Rouge et une partie de la bande territoriale qui va 
jusqu’à la frontière égyptienne », CHAGNOLLAUD, J.-P., SOUIAH, S.-A., op.cit., p. 97 [emphasis 
added]. 
(25) By the word scope we refer to the material extension of the title, namely the parcels of State territory 
which are governed (or taken into account) by a given title. In other words, we mean “the territorial 
extension of its [the title] validity”, see: DISTEFANO, G., op.cit., p. 400. 
(26) Security Council Proceedings, n°129, 384th Meeting, p. 15 (emphasis added). 
(27) It is revealing to note that the Plan of partition starts with the definition of the borders of the Arab State 
and afterwards and by default, it traces those of the Jewish State. History and effectiveness made it 
differently! 
(28) The delegate from Syria even affirmed that if the SC recommended the admission of Israel to the UN, 
then one was to ask whether “… the right of conquest [were] going to be recognized by the Security 
Council” (Security Council Proceedings, n°130, 385th Meeting, p. 7). 
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member of the Security Council. The question is therefore beyond 
dispute”(29). The quaintness of the Soviet attitude was easily rebutted when 
the British representative replied: “While Mr. Malik [Soviet delegate to the 
SC] always solemnly invokes the General Assembly’s resolution 181 (II) of 
29 November 1947, it is admitted that there are Jewish troops, for instance at 
Faluja. If Mr. Malik will give himself the trouble to consult the map of the 
partition recommended by the General Assembly’s resolution of 29 
November 1947, he will see that Faluja was awarded not to the Jews but to 
the Arabs. Therefore, Jewish forces have no right of which I am aware to 
have their troops in that particular spot. There are other places such as 
Lebanon and Transjordan where Jewish troop movements have also been 
reported”(30). But one had to wait until the intervention of the Canadian 
delegate who showed the incoherence of the Soviet position as well as the 
material gap between the scope of the title invoked by Israel and its actual 
occupation on the ground as fixed by the Green Line: 
 “I am not sure what the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics intends in regard to boundaries. In his statement last Wednesday, 
to which I have already made reference, he used the word “enforcement” in 
relation to these boundaries. He may, therefore, believe that the Security 
Council should take action to make sure that the Israeli authorities withdraw 
from all areas which were not assigned to them by the General Assembly 
resolution of 29 November 1947. He may also believe that, without reference 
to the realities of the situation in Palestine, the Security Council should adopt 
measures – by force if necessary – to bring an Arab State into existence, to 
take over the territory not assigned to the Jewish State under the 29 
November resolution. […] I am not sure either that the Provisional 
Government of Israel would wish to be made a member of the United 
Nations on these terms”(31) 
                                      
(29) Security Council Proceedings, n°129, 384th Meeting, p. 20. 
(30) Security Council Proceedings, n°130, 385th Meeting, pp. 2-3 (emphasis added). 
(31) Security Council Proceedings, n°130, 386th Meeting, p. 24 (emphasis added). 
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The Soviet delegate’s reply to the Canadian representative is plainly 
disconcerting: “That resolution is an international legal document entitling 
the State of Israel and the Arab State in Palestine to their creation and 
existence, and nobody – except, of course, the General Assembly – has a 
right to revoke it”. He then added, without any fear of being somewhat 
incoherent with respect of his previous declarations on the Israeli’s title 
based on the GA resolution, that: “Such a modification is, of course, 
possible, but that is the affair of the State of Israel and not of those who are 
trying by force to deprive it of territory which is legally its own, or to change 
the frontiers of that territory against the wishes of the State of Israel”(32). 
Furthermore, he broods over on saying that the State of Israel “… has a 
territory with frontiers clearly delineated by the General Assembly; …”(33). 
The Soviet delegate will repeat this same idea when, a few months later, the 
Security Council will put to vote its recommendation to the General 
assembly on the admission of Israel to the United Nations(34). From the 
aforementioned, it appears that it is beyond any reasonable doubt that the 
creation of the State of Israel was not realized in perfect conformity with 
resolution 181 (II). This assertion can be also corroborated by the fact that 
according to this legal instrument each Provisional Government (Jewish and 
Arab) should have sent to the United Nations a formal declaration containing 
– and showing – its respect of certain commitments. Among the latter we 
have to enumerate those regarding the internationalisation of Jerusalem as 
well as its borders, the ban of expropriation and the protection of minorities 
(and refugees), and so on(35). It is only after the independence of every State, 
“as envisaged in this plan has become effective and” and the foresaid 
declaration has been adopted by the two States that “sympathetic 
                                      
(32) Security Council Proceedings, n°130, 386th Meeting, pp. 28-29  
(33) Security Council Proceedings, n°130, 386th Meeting, p. 32. 
(34) Security Council Proceedings, n°130, 414th Meeting, p. 10. 
(35) Part C of the resolution 181 (II). 
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consideration should be given to its application for admission to membership 
in accordance with Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations”(36).  
As it appears from the British delegate intervention, it seems clear that 
from the outset (1949!) Israel was not willing to abide by the Plan of 
partition (notably with regard to the international status of Jerusalem) (37), 
which it nevertheless invoked as a legal title to justify its occupation. 
However, the SC did not loose much time on these questions and by 
resolution 64 recommended to the GA to admit Israel to the UN.  
Finally, it is legitimate to ask whether the SC recommendation for the 
admission of Israel to the UN (expression of its consent) is not vitiated by an 
error(38)insofar as it referred to a State whose borders (defined in GA 
Resolution 181 (II)) were manifestly not the same as those on the ground at 
the time of the armistice (“Green line”). As a result, SC resolution n°64 is 
based on an erroneous representation of the factual reality which “formed 
[yet] an essential basis of its consent”(39). Be that as it may, the practice of the 
GA and of SC will show – beyond any reasonable doubt – that the admission 
of Israel to the UN with its borders fixed by the armistices, has validated the 
territorial gap(40). The normative situation (resulting from the implicit 
modification of Resolution 181 (II)) is probably the same with regard of the 
Israeli occupation of West-Jerusalem(41)  which will be ultimately under the 
sovereignty of this State whereas the Plan of partition assigned for the whole 
                                      
(36) Part F of the resolution 181 (II). 
(37) « Yet we have seen statements by responsible Israeli representatives, including the Prime Minister 
himself, to the effect that part at least of Jerusalem must be incorporated in the Israeli State and that 
internationalization, if it is to be applied at all, can only affect that area held by the Arabs», Security 
Council Proceedings, 4th year, n° 17, S/414th Meeting, p. 2. 
(38) We are referring, by analogy with the régime governing the law treaties, to Article 48 of the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Indeed, both a resolution and a treaty share a common 
ground as regards their legal validity and nature since they are – and are founded upon – the expression 
of will. Moreover, it’s not useless to recall that the compulsory nature of SC resolutions must be sought 
in a treaty provision, that is to say Article 25 of the United Nations Charter.  
(39) Article 48 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
(40) And this notwithstanding in its resolution 273 (III), on the admission of Israel to the United Nations, 
the GA « recall its resolutions of 29th November 1947 [Plan of partition] and 11th December 1948 
[Provisional report of the United Nations Mediator] ». 
(41) Cf. res. 298 of the SC 
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city a special international statute (Part III of resolution 181 (II)) (42). Hence, 
in all the cases where there has been a gap between the territories awarded to 
Israel in the Plan of partition and those finally submitted to the sovereignty of 
the Jewish State, the UN has given its agreement or has validated the 
effectiveness contra titulum of Israel(43). After the Six Days War (1967), the 
SC asked Israel tirelessly, but in vain, to withdraw from the occupied 
territories (Resolution 242). This corroborates the thesis that the UN (through 
the SC and the GA) has recognised, confirmed de iure the Israeli sovereignty 
on all the territories occupied  in 1949 and delimitated by the Green Line. In 
consequence, the territorial titles which are vested with Israel were (and are): 
a) resolution 181 (II) for the sectors originally assigned to the Jewish State by 
the UN and b) the effectiveness of the occupation (validated by the UN) for 
the territories awarded to the Arab State as well as to the international city of 
Jerusalem, yet occupied since 1949. In other words, in the first case (a), the 
legal title (resolution 181 (II) is confirmed by effectiveness whereas in the 
second case (b), the effectiveness contra titulum is recognized by the h of the 
holder of the titulus adquisitionis(44). 
 
 
                                      
(42) In this regard it seems odd to observe that resolutions 194 (11 December 1948) and 303 (9 December 
1949) do not stop reaffirming the internationalisation (and thus the UN title) on the Holy City and 
Nazareth, considered as corpus separatum from the two States. Regarding the city of Jerusalem one 
can mention by analogy the Free Territory of Trieste – decided by the UN and consecrated by relevant 
Peace treaties – which in the end never got born but whose dismemberment between Yugoslavia and 
Italy (consent of the two States) was endorsed by the UN.  
(43) Likewise, the consent of the other titular (the Arab-Palestinian people) is from now granted for a long 
time (at least formally since the Oslo agreements) as it recognized the State of Israel in its actual 
borders and does not any longer claim these territories. Cf. on this point the speech by the head of the 
Palestinian delegation at the Madrid Conference (31 October 1991) Mr Haydar Abd al-Shafi 
(reproduced in The Israel-Arab reader, prepared by W. Laqueur et B. Rubin, sixth edition, London, 
2001, p. 398) 
(44) Cf. the casuistry of the relations between title and effectiveness dressed by the Chamber of the 
International Court of Justice in: Case concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina-Faso / Mali), 
Judgement of 22 December 1986: I.C.J. Reports 1986, § 63.  
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C.2 From the Six Days War to nowadays : validation of Israeli 
annexations or, instead, upholding of the military occupation ? 
The territories occupied by Israel in 1967 were by no means “sans 
maître”, for the title of territorial sovereignty still vested with the UN(45). The 
reiterated condemnations by the UN (SC (46)and GA), as well as by the States 
uti singuli, of the Israeli occupation and a fortiori its attempts of annexation 
(of East-Jerusalem) (47) show – if necessary – that the international 
community has not validated the contra titulum Israeli effectiveness(48). The 
SC, by its resolution 242 (of November 22nd 1967), “Emphasizing the 
inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war …” and “the commitment to 
act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter”, affirms that a just and 
lasting peace in the region will have henceforth to rely on two principles: a) 
“the withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent 
conflict” and b), “respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area.” (49) 
“This resolution is also significant insofar as the GA, by conferring a 
new statute of “Superobserver” to Palestine in the UN (six seats instead of 
two), “considers” that the establishment of the control of the PA “on part of 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory” constitutes a step towards the realization 
of the Plan of partition, enshrined in its Resolution 181 (II)” 
Israel allegation according to which Article 2, paragraph 4 of the 
Charter is not applicable since neither the West Bank nor the Gaza strip were 
(and are) under another State sovereignty has to be straightforwardly refuted. 
In fact, from Article 2, paragraph 4, as authentically interpreted by resolution 
2625 (XXV) and 3314 (XXIX) of the GA, ensues the absolute ban of 
                                      
(45) See Advisory opinion of the Court in 1971 (Namibia), op.cit., § 118.  Hencemore, in its 2004 advisory 
opinion the I.C.J. will declare that the mere effectiveness does not engender any valid title for the 
benefit of Israel even if its international responsibility is precisely engaged because of this fact. The 
analogy with the situation in Namibia under South-African occupation is striking. 
(46) Res. 252 (21 May 1968); 267 (3 July 169), 271 (15 September 1969) of the SC. 
(47) Res. 78 (1980) of the SC. See also : the declaration of the European council in Venice (13 June 1980) 
(48)The mechanical repetition of the rebukes of international law violations and the determination of nullity 
by the United Nations (notably by the SC) look like an incantatory process. 
(49) Emphasis added. 
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territorial acquisition by force, whether or not the territory is or not under 
State sovereignty(50). The application of this principle in the Palestine 
question has been reiterated on numberless occasions by the SC as well as by 
the GA. This fundamental principle of contemporary public international law 
related to territorial disputes goes even further than Article 2, paragraph 4,(51) 
as even the lawful use of armed force could not generate a valid title for the 
extension of territorial sovereignty. Thus, even if one were to admit the 
Israeli thesis of aggression during the six days war, its lawful use of force – 
in conformity with article 51 of the Charter (legitimate self-defence) – could 
by no means legalise neither its prolonged occupation of the territories, since 
it does not possess valid titles (the entire West Bank and Gaza), nor (even 
less!) their annexation (East-Jerusalem and the Golan) (52). The occupation of 
the West Bank and Gaza by Israel has to be considered as a war 
occupation(53) which by its prolonged character flagrantly violates relevant 
public international law rules(54). 
The Yom Kippur war (1973) and its outcome do not change the legal 
status of the Occupied Palestinian Territory as the SC – by fourteen to zero 
votes – reaffirms the obligation of the parties to the conflict to apply 
resolution 242 « in all of its parts »(55). The long litany of SC resolutions with 
                                      
(50) The I.C.J. solemnly reaffirmed the application of this paramount principle of public international law 
with regard to the “Occupied Palestinian Territory” (Legal consequences of the construction of a wall 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, op.cit., § 87).  
(51) Judge Rigaux in his dissenting opinion appended to the I.C.J. Judgement in the Oil Platforms Case 
(Iran v. United States of America) did not hesitate to qualify this rule as  the « Grundnorm » (in the 
wake of Kelsen) of contemporary international law (Judgement of 6 November 2003 (Merits): I.C.J. 
Reports 2003, § 33). 
(52) Cf. resolutions 2625 (XXV)et 3314 (XXIX) of the GA ; for the doctrine, see DISTEFANO,G., op.cit., 
p. 335, note 1418 [passim]. 
(53) Res. 242 (22 November 1967), 465 (1 March 1980), 469 (20 May 1980) of the SC as well as the 
Advisory opinion of the Court of 9 July 2004 (§§ 78-79 and 89-101). The two-headed entitlement, yet 
quintessentially and originally unique, on the ancient Mandatory Palestine explains from another legal 
standpoint the qualification of military occupation. That means that the titulus was not without titular, 
since the concerned territory was not “without a master” (“sans maître”). 
(54) Hencemore in its resolution 41/162 (1986), the GA determined that Israel, for its occupation of the 
West Bank (including Jerusalem and Gaza), violates – in addition to several international law 
obligations –  “its commitment under General Assembly resolution 273 (III) of 11 May 1949” which 
sealed its admission to the United Nations. 
(55) Res. 338 (22 October 1973). 
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similar content shows inexorably that the effectiveness of the Israeli 
occupation not only has not generated a legal title but also that the shield  of  
legality opposed by the UN ended up in undermining this very effectiveness. 
The non-recognition, the declaration of illegality, the condemnation of the 
illegal situation constitute the first effective step to the reestablishment of the 
law and the international community follows its effort of legality by using 
the legal title as a sword against the consolidation of Israeli legal title(56). The 
legality could then undermine the adverse effectiveness because the two are 
intrinsically linked and tangled up in the concept of legal title as construed 
earlier [supra A]. As they ontologically fit one in the other, they can 
reciprocally influence each other and shape each other.  
Since the (constitutive) recognition of the Palestine people as titular of 
the right of self determination (through the PLO(57) first and then the 
Palestine Authority(58)) the legal title is now jointly vested with the UN and 
the Palestine people (and its legitimate representative) (59): the entitlement of 
the territorial sovereignty is therefore two-headed(60). As the I.C.J. has 
declared in its 2004 Advisory opinion:  
 “As regards the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination, 
the Court observes that the existence of a “Palestinian people” is no longer in 
issue. Such existence has moreover been recognized by Israel in the 
exchange of letters of 9 September 1993 between Mr. Yasser Arafat, 
President of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Mr. Yitzhak 
                                      
(56) International Law Commission (of the United Nations) in its commentary upon the draft articles on the 
law of treaties expressed itself in the following way concerning the consequences of the nullity of a 
treaty in conflict with a ius cogens norm : “Paragraph 1 [of Article 67, which will become in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 71] requires the parties to a treaty void ab initio 
under article 50 [i.e. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties] first to eliminate as 
far as possible the consequences of any act done in reliance on any provision which conflicts with the 
rule of ius cogens, and secondly to bring their mutual relations into conformity with that rule », 
Yearbook of International Law Commission, 1966, Vol. II, p. 266. 
(57) Res. 3236 (XXIX) and 3237 (XXIX) adopted by the GA on 22 November 1974. 
(58) See infra p. 432. 
(59) « [L]egitimate political rights of the Palestinian people » (Res. 672 of 12/October/1990). 
(60) Cf. DISTEFANO,G, op.cit. pp 360-364. The two-headed character flows from the characteristics of the 
titulus on the territories of the ancient Mandatory Palestine, which is vested with the United Nations. 
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Rabin, Israeli Prime Minister […] The Court considers that those rights 
include the right to self-determination, as the General Assembly has 
moreover recognized on a number of occasions (see, for example, resolution 
58/163 of 22 December 2003)” (61) 
In 1988, the proclamation of the Arab State of Palestine is in all respects 
similar to that of the Jewish State 40 years earlier, to one (sizeable) 
exception, namely the lack of effectiveness of the territorial occupation. In 
both cases, the proclamations are referring to resolution 181 (II). The GA has 
taken note of it in its resolution 43/177 (15 December 1988), whose text 
displays a major incoherence. On one hand, the GA rightly recalls its Plan of 
partition, but on the other, it goes on affirming “the need to enable the 
Palestinian people to exercise their sovereignty over their territory occupied 
since 1967”. Does the GA seem to confirm the validation of the famous 
territorial gap and, notwithstanding the reference to resolution 181 (II), limit 
then the future Arab State of Palestine to the territories occupied by Israel in 
1967 reducing accordingly the territorial sphere of the exercise by the Arab 
Palestine people of its right of self-determination? Even more, this resolution 
seems to seal in the views of the GA (which we recall is the author of the 
Plan of partition) the definitive death of the special statute of the Holy 
City(62). However, 10 years later the same GA will recall “its resolution 181 
(II) of 29 November 1947, in which, inter alia, it recommended the partition 
of Palestine into a Jewish State and an Arab State, with Jerusalem as a corpus 
separatum” (63). This resolution is also significant insofar as the GA, by 
conferring a new statute of “Superobserver” to the Palestine Authority in the 
UN (six seats instead of two), “considers” that the establishment of the 
control of the PA “on part of the Occupied Palestinian Territory” constitutes 
a step towards the realization of the Plan of partition, enshrined in its 
                                      
(61) Op.cit., § 118. 
(62) We can always imagine for the sake of the scientific investigation that res. 181 (II) is from now on 
modified through the subsequent practice so that any dispositions related to the internationalisation of 
the city of Jerusalem as well as the ones that fix the original partition (i.e. “territorial gap”) are 
amended or even abrogated. 
(63) Res. 52/250 (13 July 1998). In this same resolution, the GA refers to its res. 43/177. 
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Resolution 181 (II). May we thus infer that the latter is eventually exhumed 
by the GA? This interpretation could be supported by the subsequent 
resolutions adopted by the GA(64) and, more recently, by the 2004 I.C.J. 
Advisory opinion(65). What can we conclude? We have to suspend here our 
judgement to the negotiations to come. 
From 2002 onward, the SC too pierces the terminological barrier when 
it “Affirm[s] a vision of a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live 
side by side within secure and recognized borders”(66). The SC dared then to 
cross the Rubicon: a Palestine State will be established according to 
resolutions 242 and 338 which stipulate – it is not useless to remind – the 
withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories (East-Jerusalem included).  
The two-headed entitlement(67) of territorial sovereignty on the West 
Bank (including East-Jerusalem) – which flows from the title of the UN on 
the territories of the Mandatory Palestine – is not put in doubt and is 
corroborated by the peremptory nature of the norm that embodies the right of 
self-determination. In its resolution 41/162 the GA “Rejects all agreements 
and arrangements which violate the inalienable rights of the Palestinian 
people” among which one has to mention the “occupation of its territories”. 
Two considerations may be formulated from the standpoint of titles of State 
jurisdiction. Any agreement between Israel and a third State (as it has been 
the case in the past between Australia and Indonesia with regard to East-
Timor continental shelf), on the occupied Palestinian territories is void 
because of the lack of valid titulus vested with Israel (principle of self-
determination). In the same way any agreement between Israel and the PA 
with regard to the legal title of the occupied territories is also void if not 
                                      
(64) In its res. 58/21 the GA notes “that it has been fifty-six years since the adoption of resolution 181 (II) 
of 29 November 1947 and thirty-six years since the occupation of Palestinian territory, including East 
Jerusalem, in 1967”.  However, one cannot but observe that to these two critical different dates 
correspond two of different territorial extensions of the legal title (see supra note 25). Then, how to 
conciliate them at the end of the day? 
(65) Op.cit., §§ 71 and 162. 
(66) Res. 1397 (12 march 2002), 1515 (19 November 2003). 
(67) By this term we mean the appurtenance, the imputation of the subjective right (in this case, the right of 
territorial sovereignty) to the subject of law (entitlement). 
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endorsed by the UN, as the entitlement is two-headed. The double hat of the 
titulus is reiterated by the GA when it affirms that the UN has a permanent 
responsibility in the Palestine question and its settlement(68). The 
international community ultimately represents the true depositary of 
international legality and thus of titulus adquisitionis. 
C.2.1. East-Jerusalem(69) 
The annexation of East-Jerusalem must to be qualified, to borrow the 
terms of the United Nations resolutions, « null and void” or “illegal” (70). 
From 21 may 1968 onwards, the SC “Considers that all legislative and 
administrative measures and actions taken by Israel […] which tend to 
change the legal status of Jerusalem are invalid and cannot change that 
status” and “[u]rgently calls upon Israel to rescind all such measures already 
taken” (71). These measures and actions had such an impact that the physical 
and sociological features of Jerusalem have been henceforth deeply shattered 
in few years (72). This determination of invalidity is opposable ipso iure to 
Member States (art. 25 of the United Nations Charter) and prevails on any 
obligation arising out of any other international agreement (art 103 of the 
Charter). The GA which had formerly agreed the Plan of partition allowing 
the transfer of the titulus adquisitionis to the two future States while retaining 
it for the entire city of Jerusalem, immediately condemned the occupation of 
                                      
(68) Res. 56/36. 
(69) « … le terme de ‘Jérusalem-Est’ est trompeur. La Jérusalem sous pouvoir jordanien, entre 1948 et 
1967, était d’une superficie de 38 kilomètres carrés et n’englobait que la vieille ville et les quartiers 
adjacents. Tandis que la ‘Jérusalem-Est’ annexée par Israël s’étend sur 108 kilomètres carrés et 
englobe 28 cités et villages qui ne faisaient pas partie de la ville »,  Rapoport, Ha’aretz (translated and 
reprinted in : Courrier international, n° 743, p. 27). Be that as it may, the modifications carried on by 
Israel regarding the « occupied territories » (included East-Jerusalem and whatever its extension),  are 
« null and void » with regard to international law which obviously prevails over municipal law. In this 
regard, see: GA res. ES-10/6 (24 February 1999). 
(70) The GA « [d]eplores the transfer by some States of their diplomatic missions to Jerusalem in violation 
of Security Council resolution 478 (1980) and their refusal to comply with the provisions of that 
resolution », res. 41/162 C (4 December 1986). Likewise : res. 58/22 (3 December 2003). 
(71) Res. 252 (21 May 1968). This injunction counts among the consequences of the engagement of the 
international responsibility of the State, notably with regard to the restoration of the statu quo ante (art. 
35 of the ILC Articles, infra, note 83). 
(72) CHAGNOLLAUD, J.-P., SOUIAH, S.-A., op.cit., p. 192. 
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its Eastern part (73). When the Knesset promulgated (30th July 1980) the law 
of annexation of East-Jerusalem by calling the reunified city “capital of 
Israel”, the SC rapidly reaffirmed, in addition to the already known 
determinations and injunctions, the nullity of such constitutional, legislative 
and administrative measures and asked Israel to respect all the previous 
resolutions regarding the Palestine question(74). By its resolutions(75), the SC 
undermines irreversibly the effectiveness of the so-called consolidation 
process of the Israeli legal title in the occupied territories. By its 
ascertainment of the invalidity and the arising from the engagement of the 
international responsibility of Israel, the SC fights efficiently with the sword 
of the titulus against the effectiveness of the Israeli occupation. In its 
resolution 478 (1980), the SC affirms the nullity of Israel “basic law” and the 
engagement of the responsibility of this State for its enactment(76). 
Subsequently it decided “not to recognize the ‘basic law’” and it 
consequently called upon the Member States to comply with this decision. 
Moreover, the SC enjoined those States who had the unwise idea to establish 
their diplomatic mission in Jerusalem to withdraw it. Because of the nullity 
proclaimed by the SC of the measures taken by Israel, the legal status of the 
West Bank (including East-Jerusalem) remains that of military occupation. A 
simple material fact – governed by the laws of war – which does not entail 
the transfer of the title of territorial sovereignty. The UN (through the SC, the 
GA(77) and lastly the I.C.J. (78))  never stopped recalling that Israel is the 
occupying power and by this fact is bound to the international obligations 
pertaining to this statute. 
The Israeli occupation is therefore a simple material fact implemented 
in defiance of two peremptory norms of public international law: a) the 
                                      
(73) Res. 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) (14 July 1967), 41/162 (4 December 1986), res. 56/31 (3 December 
2001), res. 58/22 (3 December 2003). 
(74) Resolution 478 (20th August 1980). Likewise, the GA, supra note 73. 
(75) Among others: res. 298 (25 September 1971); 465 (1 March 1908); 478 (20 August 1980). 
(76) This represents a tangling up – peculiar to public international law – between nullity, unlawfulness and 
effectiveness. 
(77) Res. ES-10/4 (1997). 
(78) Cf. supra note 53. 
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prohibition of the use of force (one of the principles of the UN enlisted in 
Article 2); b) the right of self-determination of peoples (one of the purposes 
of the UN, Article 1). It ensues that sheer effectiveness would not create a 
valid legal title to the benefit of Israel. 
In other respects, the SC affirmed that Israeli attempts purporting to 
change the status of the Holy City “prejudice … the interests of the 
international community”(79) since, as the GA will affirm 32 years later: “the 
international community, through the United Nations, has a legitimate 
interest in the question of the City of Jerusalem and the protection of the 
unique spiritual, religious and cultural dimension of the city …”(80).  We wish 
to make clear that the legal entitlement to the Holy City is not two-headed as 
the UN still retains exclusively the titulus.  To her alone falls the legal power 
of changing or confirming the modification of the international statute of the 
Holy City. Thus, in the absence of a valid territorial title, the animus imperii 
– shown by Israel through its law of annexation – is by no means sufficient to 
acquire the titulus because the latter is vested with the UN (international 
status of this territory). 
C.2.2 West Bank (with the exception of East-Jerusalem) and the Gaza 
strip 
The effectiveness cannot create a legal title on a territory – like the West 
Bank and the Gaza strip – which is not res nullius. Moreover, since the 
occupation has been realized and perpetrated in violation of two norms of ius 
cogens (the prohibition of the use of force and the right of self-
determination) and since the UN possesses by virtue of GA resolution 181 
(II) the power of disposal of the territorial title, the mere consent of the 
Palestinian people will not be sufficient to transfer the titulus because the 
latter is two-headed. Then, if the PA itself could not “validate” the 
unlawfulness of the illegal occupation, the UN and he PA can do it jointly. 
                                      
(79) Resolution 298 (25th September 1971). 
(80) Res. 58/22 (3 December 2003). 
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The theoretical possibility of validation–recognition of the Israeli annexation 
has nevertheless not taken place. In fact, at no time, either the UN or the 
States uti singuli have recognized the extension of the Israeli territorial 
sovereignty on these territories. In this regard the SC “[d]etermining [that] 
the policy and practices of Israel in establishing settlements in the Palestinian 
and other Arab territories occupied since 1967 have no legal validity” (81), 
urges Israel “to rescind those measures … on an urgent basis”(82) and “Calls 
upon all States not to provide Israel with any assistance to be used 
specifically in connexion with settlements in the occupied territories” (83). 
The SC goes even farther as to “reaffirm the overriding necessity to end the 
prolonged occupation of Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, 
including Jerusalem” (84). The GA – the only plenary organ of the United 
Nations – expressed its grave concern that: « … that the Palestinian and other 
Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, still remains under 
Israeli occupation, that the relevant resolutions of the United Nations have 
not been implemented and that the Palestinian people is still denied the 
restoration of its land and the exercise of its inalienable national rights in 
conformity with international law, as reaffirmed by the resolutions of the 
United Nations” (85).      
In addition to that, Israel’s animus occupandi is lacking as testified by 
the numerous bilateral commitments entered into by Israel(86) which make 
                                      
(81) Res. 446 (22nd March 1979) [emphasis added]. See also: res. 58/21 (3 December 2003). 
(82) Res. 465 (1st March 1980). Also : Res 452 (20 July 1979). 
(83) Res. 465. This injunction has to be read in the light of Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Text on State 
responsibility adopted by the International Law Commission (of the United Nations) in 2001 (annexed 
to Res. 56/83 of the GA). See also: 471 (5 June 1980) ; 41/161 A and B, of the GA (4 December 
1986) ; ES-10/6 of the GA ; 56/31 of the GA (3 December 2001). 
(84) Res. 471 (5 June 1980). Also : 476 (30 June 1980). 
(85) Res. 41/162 of 4 December 1986 (emphasis added). 
(86) The Camp David Agreements (1979); the Oslo Agreements (1993) ; the intermediate Israeli Palestinian 
agreement on the West Bank  and the Gaza strip signed in Washington on 28 September 1995. In the 
same line one has to mention the Declaration of the Quartet (UN; RUSSIA; USA; EU) of 16 July 2002 
(annexed to the Declaration of the President of the SC of 18 July 2002): “The Quartet reaffirms that 
there must be a negotiated permanent settlement based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 
338 […] The Israeli occupation that began in 1967 must end, and Israel must have secure and 
recognized borders” (emphasis added). In the light of this last fragment, one dares to maintain that the 
semantic dispute (between the French and English texts of resolution 242) respectively « of » and 
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explicit reference to resolutions 242 and 338. In this respect one cannot 
evoke the Peace Treaty with Egypt (1979) – regarding Gaza(87)  – and that 
with Jordan (1994), regarding he western bank of the Jordan(88). As the 
World Court rightly declared in its landmark 2004 advisory opinion:  
« That treaty [i.e. with Jordan, concluded in 1994] fixed the boundary 
between the two States “with reference to the boundary definition under the 
Mandate as is shown in Annex I (a) . . . without prejudice to the status of any 
territories that came under Israeli military government control in 1967” 
(Article 3, paragraphs 1 and 2). Annex I provided the corresponding maps 
and added that, with regard to the “territory that came under Israeli military 
government control in 1967”, the line indicated “is the administrative 
boundary” with Jordan »(89) 
As a consequence, the legal status of the border between Jordan and 
Israel indicates clearly that Israel itself recognizes that it does not possess the 
sovereignty on the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Its actual occupation is 
then without legal title. 
The Court could not have affirmed, in its aforementioned Advisory 
opinion, that the course of the wall beyond the Green Line violates 
international law (N° 3  of the Dispositif) if it hadn’t first determined that 
Israel has no titulus adquisitionis to administer and occupy the West Bank 
(including East-Jerusalem) and Gaza and even less to annex them. 
                                                                                                      
« from » appear as an idle question, because Israel is called upon – in this declaration – to terminate the 
occupation it “started in 1967”. 
(87) The Peace Treaty of 26 March 1979 (between Egypt and Israel) provides in its article II that – without 
prejudice to the question of the Gaza strip –  the international borders between Israel and Egypt will be 
those between the Mandatory Palestine and Egypt. In the Preamble of this instrument the necessity of 
the settlement of the question in accordance with resolutions 242 and 338 is aptly recalled. 
(88) By virtue of this agreement, the protection of the Islamic holy places in Jerusalem has been entrusted to 
the Hashemite King of Jordan. 
(89) Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, op.cit., § 6. 
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Likewise, the agreement between Israel and PA(90), envisaged by the 
Roadmap in its third phase, will have to be in accordance with – notably – 
resolutions 242 and 338. From this standpoint, the Roadmap, presented by 
the Quartet the 30th April 2003, has become an instrument for the 
implementation of resolutions 242 and 338 through the creation of new 
obligations to the Parties. The World Court, in its oft-cited Advisory opinion, 
reiterates that the settlement of the Palestine question must be in conformity 
with international law, that is to say notably resolutions 242 and 338(91). This 
shows the two-headed entitlement of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. 
Should the future agreements between Israel and PA depart from these 
resolutions, only the endorsement by the UN would allow the definitive 
transfer of the titulus(92). If indeed it is true that the Oslo agreements of 1993, 
which make explicit reference to resolutions 242 and 338 as pillars of the 
settlement of the Palestine question, modify in certain parts of the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory the rights and obligations of Israel as an occupying 
power, it is not less true that they do not – and cannot - obliterate the general 
obligation - stipulated in the aforementioned resolutions – for Israel to 
withdraw. The Oslo agreements, from now on welcomed and endorsed by the 
SC are mentioned by the latter in order to specify the obligations incumbent 
for Israel concerning the withdrawal from the occupied territories. Therefore, 
the modalities of the withdrawal have been changed but not territorial titles. 
In conclusion we can sustain that Israel’s occupation of the West Bank 
as well as the Gaza strip violates the title which is jointly enjoyed by the 
Palestine people (through, nowadays, the PA) and by UN. Likewise, Israel’s 
occupation of East-Jerusalem violates the territorial title which is vested with 
the UN. 
                                      
(90) The same international treaty also embodies the mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO (see 
res. 56/36 of the GA). 
(91) See also: res. 58/21. 
(92) See supra p. 437. 
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